Studies in II Peter 3: Naturalistic Uniformity

by Pat Hardeman
via Sentry Magazine, Vol. 20 No. 2, June 1994

The second coming of Christ is the first of those “last” things (Greek: eschatos) scorned by scoffers in mocking words: “Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation” (II Peter 3:4). Notice the basis of their scorn: “all things continue as they were.” This doctrine of “continuity” or the “uniformity of nature” is “the ultimate syllogism” (John Stuart Mill) underlying the philosophic Naturalism which pervades so very much of our whole world. This doctrine excludes all Supernatural activity, including miracles and divine judgments involving cataclysmic events such as the flood and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (II Peter 2:5-6). It insists that Nature, as the sciences and senses disclose it, is the whole show, all there is to reality. Examine the uniformity dogma for a moment. Yes, it is a dogma, for as Tennant observes, it is neither an “empirically knowable fact nor a priori truth, nor self-evident axiom, nor essential precondition either of experience or of such science as we have, nor inference logically derivable from anything certain” (F.R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, Vol. 2, p. 21, London: Cambridge University Press, 1927).

Belief in universal laws of nature has a biblical background. The noted A.N. Whitehead said the belief “must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher” (Science and the Modern World, p.18. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946). As the scientific revolution progressed from the Renaissance, certain philosophers began omitting God from the picture, arguing that God was unnecessary to the orderliness of the natural world. By the 19th century and the time of Darwin, much of the world jumped at the chance to leave God out of the picture completely. Darwin’s work seemed to promise a future of scientific discoveries in which all the gradations of progressively complex forms of life would be found. Though Darwin lamented in his conclusion “the extreme imperfection of the geologic record” (Origin of Species, p.372), he certainly anticipated a much more ample geologic verification than what followed.

When the most complex life forms appeared in the oldest strata, and the almost infinite “missing links” were never found, new theories were developed. Emergent Evolution appeared on the scene, in which the gradual development of new forms was said to be out the window. Now, such people as Henri Bergson (Creative Evolution, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1923), and Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920), all argued, as did others (notably De Vries, Simpson, Goldschmidt), that, in Simpson’s words: “in no case is an approximately continuous sequence from one order to another known” (Tempo and Mode in Evolution, p.106, New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). New qualities could simply not be explained by past repetitive changes. The qualities simply “emerge”; they happen! Darwin criticized such notions by saying, “little advantage is gained by believing that new forms are suddenly developed in an inexplicable manner from old and wildly different forms, over the old belief in the creation of species from the dust of the earth” (Origin of Species, p.369).

The doctrine of continuity or uniformity has had more important problems: Heisenberg discovered the uncertainty principle in physics; subatomic particles simply don't obey Newtonian laws. Then Max Planck discovered quantum mechanics: forces in nature are simply not continuous. I used Patrick Murphy’s Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935) for many years in teaching introduction courses. Murphy speaks from the viewpoint of an emergent evolutionist, saying that Heisenberg’s principle “seems to disturb the foundations of science itself” (p.320). John Dewey said it meant that scientific laws are “formulae for the prediction of the probability of an observable occurrence” (The Quest For Certainty, p. 204, New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1929).

Who should now listen to the mockers: “Where is the promise of his coming? for all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation” (II Peter 3:4). That doctrine is human dogma. Of a certainty, God does decree sunshine and shadow, seedtime and harvest, and the almost infinitely many detailed operations of nature. The same God, who has interrupted the natural order, does rule in the affairs of men and nations providentially and will indeed be our judge at the end (Hebrews 9:27).